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THE BIOSIMILAR PATENT DANCE – IF YOU DON’T
DANCE, YOU’RE NO FRIEND OF MINE
By Alexej Ladonnikov1
In response to political pressure, Congress has been seeking
solutions to control drug prices and make it easier for consumers to
afford pharmaceuticals. The legislative response to this concern was
the Biosimilar, Price, Competition, and Innovation ACT (“BCPIA”).
This act allows the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to
accelerate the approval pathway for biosimilar drugs that effectively
act as generic drugs (“generics”). This note analyzes how courts have
handled the following three outstanding issues with the BCPIA: (1)
whether compliance with the BCPIA is required or optional; (2)
whether an applicant needs to wait until after the FDA approves a drug
to notify the creator of the patented product of their intent to market
the biologic; and (3) whether the applicant needs to participate in the
entire process.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the financial collapse of 2008, American consumer
budgets have been increasingly squeezed.2 This led to increased
political pressure to rein in drug prices.3 In 2009, Congress enacted the
BPCIA in an effort to control drug prices.4 The BPCIA provided an
accelerated FDA approval pathway for “biosimilars,” which are
biologics with similar pharmacological features to ones already on the
market. Those features are similar enough that biosimilars effectively
act as generics.5 Biologics are a class of large molecules, usually
derived via recombinant DNA techniques in specialized tissues
cultures, producing drugs as complex as monoclonal antibodies and
immunoglobins.6
Biologics are one of the fastest growing segments of the
pharmaceutical industry, with the top 10 products accounting for $73
billion in global sales as of 2017.7 Unfortunately, intellectual property
rights relating to biosimilars, when marketed as generics, are too
complex to effectively regulate under the pre-BPCIA framework

2

Household Expenditures and Income, Pew Charitable Trusts (Mar 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/03/household_expenditures_and_income.pdf.
3
Shamane Mills, States Try To Rein In Prescription Drug Prices, WPR (April 27, 2017, 3:15pm),
https://www.wpr.org/states-try-rein-prescription-drug-prices.
4
42 U.S.C. § 262.
5
Generic Drugs: Questions & Answers, FDA INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS (DRUGS) (Jan. 04
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm.
6
How do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION,
https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ.
7
Kathlyn Stone, Top 10 Biologic Drugs in the United States, THE BALANCE (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.thebalance.com/top-biologic-drugs-2663233.
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established by the Hatch-Waxman Act.8 The BPCIA established such
a framework for handling patent infringement disputes by a mechanism
that has come to be known as “the patent dance.”9 This dance involves
several rounds of information exchange and negotiation to clearly
delineate any infringement claims, and is meant to cut down on the time
and expense of discovery and litigation.10
This article outlines the current jurisprudence on some of the
major unresolved issues relating to the BPCIA. This article first
summarizes the salient elements of the BPCIA and the patent dance,
then addresses three major issues that the courts are currently reviewing
or have recently reviewed. First, this article assesses whether
compliance with the BPCIA patent dance is a required or an optional
procedure. This issue will determine how much “bite” the BPCIA
legislation has on parties that wish to use the abbreviated approval
pathway, but spurn open exchanges of information, and consequently
impact how many millions of dollars worth of litigation will play out.
Second, and in conjunction with the first issue, the question arises of
whether an applicant must wait until after FDA approval to notify a
reference product sponsor (“RPS”), the creator of the patented product,
of their intent to market their product. The answer will dictate whether
patent holders (“innovators”) will be given an extra 180 days of patent
exclusivity on top of their existing 12 years. Lastly, this article looks at
whether innovators or generic manufacturers must engage with the
entire sequence of steps, or may engage more selectively, thereby
influencing expensive litigation while still gaining some benefit from
the legislation. Each of these three issues are raised in current and
pending court actions at varying levels. The analysis of this article is
informed by the discussion of these issues in such court cases alongside
the legislative history of the BPCIA.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. What are Biosimilars and why is the BPCIA needed?
In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act (informally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act) was enacted.11
Hatch-Waxman encouraged more companies to make use of the

8

Dennis Crouch, BPCIA: Patent Dance Steps Becoming a Bit Clearer, PATENTLYO (Aug. 16,
2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/08/patent-becoming-clearer.html.
9
Id.
10
Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 775 (2010).
11
21 U.S.C. § 355.
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Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for generic drugs.12
While generic drug manufacturers were already allowed to use this
approval “fast-lane,” Hatch-Waxman gave innovators and generic
manufacturers protections and incentives designed to get generics to
market sooner while also protecting innovators.13 This lead to a boom
in the generic drug industry, which helped drive drug prices down over
time.14
Up until the 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry was working
overwhelmingly on “small molecule” drugs.15 Drugs of this type are
created by chemists going through discrete chemical addition steps to
form the structure of the final molecule.16 Since then, the advent and
refinement of recombinant DNA technology has opened up an entirely
new type of product – large molecule drugs, also known as biologics
or biopharmaceuticals. These “large molecules” offer orders of
magnitude more complexity and clinical applications. The BPCIA
defines a biologic as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product,
protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous
product . . . .”17
For the purposes of this article, the focus will be on therapeutic
proteins. Humira is an excellent example of a therapeutic protein, as it
illustrates the structural and manufacturing complexity of biologics, as
well as both their economic and medical value. It is the leading
treatment for rheumatoid arthritis and has garnered 16 billion dollars in
sales as of 2016.18 In context of technical complexity, the active
molecule in Humira has a molecular weight of 144,190.3 g/mol, while
12

Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and
Generic Drug Competition, FINNEGAN: CURRENT TOPICS IN MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY (2010),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-hatch-waxman-act-encouraging-innovation-andgeneric-drug.html.
13
Donald Chisum, Chisum on Patents 161 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2017).
14
Ralph A. Lewis, The Emerging Effects of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, 8 J. CONTEMP HEALTH L. & POL’Y 361, 361-78 (1992); Luke M. Olson
& Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic Drug Competition on Generic Drug Prices During
the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day Exclusivity Period, FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS (Apr. 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/estimating-effect-entry-generic-drugprices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/wp317.pdf.
15
Orphan Drugs Lead 2015 Approvals, BIOTECHPRIMER (Jan. 7 2016),
https://weekly.biotechprimer.com/orphan-drugs-drive-fda-approval-record-for-2015/.
16
How do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION,
https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ.
17
42 U.S.C § 262(i)(1).
18
Alex Philippidis, The Top 15 Best-Selling Drugs of 2016, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECH
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.genengnews.com/the-lists/the-top-15-best-selling-drugs-of2016/77900868.
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another recent blockbuster drug named Sovaldi (which treats Hepatitis
C) has a molecular weight of 529.5 g/mol, which is typical of small
molecules.19 This 1000 factor difference is salient because it
underscores the critical value of manufacturing techniques for large
molecule drugs.20 A talented chemist can look at a small molecule
compound and work backwards from the structure to form a synthesis
pathway of discrete steps that is different from that of the innovator’s
steps.21 In contrast, large molecules can only be assembled by
biological processes by living cells, usually by genetically engineering
bacteria and optimizing their environment in highly selective ways.22
Recombinant DNA technology has been used to engineer various kinds
of specialized tissues to produce the required drugs en masse.23 This
results in a situation where a generic manufacturer is far more likely to
infringe on an innovator’s patented manufacturing techniques when
producing a biologic than a small molecule.
Because of how much more complicated both structures and
production techniques are in biologics, the regulatory mechanisms
meant to stimulate generic manufacturing under the Hatch-Waxman
Act are inadequate.24 The cost of developing a biologic is currently
estimated to be $2.5 billion (doubling in the last ten years alone) 25,
whereas generic manufacture is estimated to only cost $100-250
million.26 This cost differential results in both parties willing to engage
in costly and exceptionally time consuming patent suits, resulting in
drugs getting to market far more slowly than they otherwise would.
Thus, it became necessary to pass legislation aimed specifically at the
increased complexity found in biologics, resulting in the BPCIA.
19

See Christopher A.Lipinski, Lead- and drug-like compounds: the rule-of-five revolution, 1
DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY: TECHNOLOGIES, 337-341 (2004).
20
Small Molecule Versus Biological Drugs, GENETICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Jun. 29,
2012),
http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research/Small-molecule-versus-biologicaldrugs.
21
See generally Brown et. al, Organic Chemistry (4th ed. 2005).
22
Thomas Morrow & Linda Hull Felcone, Defining the Difference: What Makes Biologics
Unique, NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (Sep. 4, 2004),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3564302/.
23
Id.
24
Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act - 25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical
Scales
Balanced,
PHARMACY
TIMES
(Aug.
15,
2009),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplement0809/generichatchwaxman-0809.
25
Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5B, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-newpharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b/.
26
Erwin Blackstone & Joseph Fuhr Jr., The Economics of Biosimilars, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFORMATION
(Sep.
2013),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4031732/.
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B. BPCIA—abbreviated approval pathway
Much like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA offers an
abbreviated approval pathway for biologics that are meant to act as
cheaper replacements for biologics already on the market. For small
molecules, generic products contain the identical chemical element as
the drug innovator’s product. In biologics, the active element must be
relatively similar to the original product but does not have to have
identical physical properties. The BPCIA categorizes biologics into
two classes: biosimilar and interchangeable.27
To receive biosimilar status, a manufacturer must prove that the
compound in question is “highly similar to the reference product
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components . .
.”28 and that there is “no clinically meaningful differences between the
biological product and the reference product in terms of the safety,
purity, and potency of the product.”29 To achieve this, data must be
derived from analytical studies of the material itself as well as clinical
studies, which include immunogenicity, pharmacokinetics, and
pharmacodynamics.30 These clinical studies must sufficiently show
“safety, purity, and potency in 1 or more appropriate conditions of use
for which the reference product is licensed and intended to be used and
for which licensure is sought for the biological product . . . .” 31
Essentially, a generic manufacturer must prove chemical and clinical
similarity so as to show no meaningful difference when compared to
the reference material. Additionally, the mechanism of action must be
the same if that mechanism is known, the route and dosage must be the
same, and the production facilities must meet safety standards.32
Once these requirements have been met, a drug is given biosimilar
status. This means that it may be marketed as an equivalent treatment
as the reference product, but a patient’s health care provider must take
action to switch a patient onto the newly marketed generic.33 This leads
to the second tier of similarity, codified in the BPCIA as
“interchangeable.”34 Once a drug has satisfied the requirements to be
interchangeable with its reference product, it may be switched with the
27

42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A).
29
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B).
30
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
31
DONALD O. BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA
APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 21-1 (8th ed. 2017)
32
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III); 42 U.S.C. §
262(k)(2)(A)(i)(IV); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V).
33
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3).
34
Id.
28
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reference product without any action by the prescribing health care
provider, making it more akin to a small molecule generic.35
To be given interchangeable status, a product must first satisfy all
of the biosimilarity requirements outlined above.36 After this, an
applicant must show that if a “product that is administered more than
once to an individual, the risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy
of alternating or switching between use of the biological product and
the reference product is not greater than the risk of using the reference
product.”37 Essentially, the risks associated with switching from
original to generic must be no greater than the risks of the original drug
alone. This criterion is critical for drugs that require long term
administration as opposed to single dose drugs used to treat acute
conditions.
C. The Patent Dance
The BPCIA laid out a mechanism by which the RPS and
biosimilar applicants could resolve patent disputes. This mechanism,
dubbed the “patent dance,” consists of a series of steps between the
RPS, which is the party that owns the drug being used as a reference
material for a biosimilar, and the abbreviated Biologic License
Application (“aBLA”) applicant going through several rounds of
information exchange. This dance is aimed at narrowing the scope of
the eventual patent litigation, preemptively cutting down on costly and
time consuming discovery and helping deliver drugs to patients more
quickly and at a lower cost.38
The patent dance involves two stages, the first having seven major
steps:
Stage 1:
1. Applicant files aBLA with FDA, creating an “artificial”
infringement.
2. Within 20 days of the FDA accepting their drug for review,
a new drug applicant notifies the RPS of their plans to
release a biosimilar, confidentially discloses their FDA
application for the drug, and confidentially discloses their
manufacturing information.
3. Within 60 days of (1), RPS then identifies patents it could
35

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A).
37
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(B).
38
Joanna Brougher, The Biosimilars Act: Promoting or Discouraging the Development of Generic
Biologics?,
NATIONAL
CENTER
FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFORMATION
(2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3008392/.
36
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reasonably assert against the applicant (based on
applicant’s disclosures), as well as RPS’ own willingness
to license those patents.
4. Within 60 days of (2), applicant responds with explanations
of why their product does not infringe upon identified
patents, why RPS’ claims are invalid, or why they are
unenforceable. Alternatively, applicant may state that it
will not begin commercial marketing until the listed
patents expire.
5. Within 60 days of (3), RPS provides a rebuttal to
applicant’s claims of non-infringement, invalidity, or
unenforceability. After applicant’s receipt of the rebuttal,
the parties have a period of 15 days to negotiate in good
faith as to which patents should be the subject of an
infringement suit.
6. If the parties agree on which patents to litigate over, RPS
files suit over those patents within 30 days of the
agreement. But if parties fail to agree within 15 days of
starting negotiations, then they simultaneously exchange
a list of patents that each party believes should be the
subject of the infringement suit.
a. After negotiations fail but before the actual
exchange of lists of patents, the applicant has to
inform RPS of the number of patents it intends to
list. RPS’s list of patents cannot exceed this
number, unless applicant lists no patents, in
which case RPS may list one.
7. If the parties simultaneously exchange lists, then RPS has
30 days to file infringement claims on each of the patents
on the exchanged lists. Applicant then notifies FDA of the
suit within 30 days of service and provides a copy of the
complaint.
Stage 2:
1. Applicant provides RPS a notice of commercial marketing
(“NCM”) no later than 180 days before the date it seeks
to market their biosimilar.39
II.

ANALYSIS

Unsurprisingly, a contingent of biotech companies have taken
each other to court over their respective engagements with the process
outlined above. The following analysis looks first at outstanding issues
39

42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
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that still need resolution, and second, at issues that have been resolved
without addressing secondary problems.
The first major issue, recently decided by the Supreme Court, is
whether parties are obligated to engage with the patent dance at all.40
Dependent on this initial engagement issue, is the additional issue of
whether an applicant can send its NCM to the RPS prior to FDA
approval.41 Finally, the issue of whether parties have to engage in the
patent dance to its completion or may engage in selective steps is
addressed. 42
A. Amgen v. Sandoz – is the patent dance required, and when
are NCMs filed?
Of the numerous legal strategies that have arisen since the passage
of the BPCIA, one of the most adventurous has been the idea that the
patent dance is merely one legal avenue that a party may pursue, but is
not required. This strategy has been put into play by several companies,
spurring varied judicial responses. Of this group, Amgen Inc. v Sandoz
Inc. has made its way to final judgment at the Supreme Court of the
United States, with the decision being rendered in June 2017.43
1. Background
Amgen has been on the forefront of BPCIA litigation on a variety
of issues, but some of the most pivotal decisions have come from
Amgen’s dispute with Sandoz over Sandoz’s proposed usage of the
BPCIA to gain streamlined FDA approval for a generic version of
Amgen’s Filgrastim.44 This widely profitable drug is used to treat
chemotherapy side effects and has been on the market since 1991.45 In
October 2014, Amgen filed a complaint, alleging that Sandoz had filed
an aBLA with the FDA to take advantage of the shorter approval
pathway, but had refused to provide Amgen with a copy.46
Additionally, the complaint stated that Sandoz had sent Amgen an
NCM prior to FDA approval of the application.47 Amgen sought
injunctive relief to force Sandoz to comply with the parameters of the

40

Complaint at 2, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. et al, No. 14-CV-04741 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2015).
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1667-8 (2017).
42
Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion Healthcare Co., 239 F. Supp. 3d 328, 332 (2017).
43
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668-9 (2017).
44
Filgrastim, Tbo-filgrastim, DRUGS (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://www.drugs.com/monograph/filgrastim-tbo-filgrastim.html.
45
Id.
46
Complaint at 2, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. et al, No. 14-CV-04741 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2015).
47
Id.
41
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BPCIA.48 Amgen initially filed suit and lost in the Northern District of
California, then appealed the ruling in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which made its way to the Supreme
Court shortly thereafter.
2.

Issues

The issues raised by Amgen’s complaint are two-fold. The first
issue is that by refusing to provide Amgen with a copy of the aBLA
sent to the FDA, Sandoz was refusing to engage in the patent dance,
and it was Amgen’s position that such engagement was mandatory and
could be enforced via injunctive relief.49 The second issue was whether
an NCM could be issued prior to FDA approval of an application, as
this would cut short the otherwise required 180-day continued
exclusivity period that a patent holder keeps between generic approval
and first commercial marketing.50
3.

Supreme Court Decision

The Court held that federal injunctive relief was unavailable as a
means of enforcing the patent dance, but remanded the case back to the
circuit court to determine if state injunctive relief is a valid
alternative.51 Furthermore, the Court held that an applicant did not have
to wait for FDA approval to send an RPS the required NCM.52
a. aBLA Disclosure
21 U.S.C. §262(l)(2)(A) states that an applicant “shall provide to
the reference product sponsor a copy of the application submitted to
the Secretary under subsection (k) . . . .”53 The circuit court held that
the list of remedies available for artificial infringement found in
§271(e)(4) (which does not contain injunctive relief) was the
exhaustive list.54 While this lead to the correct conclusion, the Supreme
Court found this to be the incorrect reasoning. It explained §271(e)(4)
only applies to artificial infringement, and that the positive act of
handing over the aBLA was what created that artificial infringement.

48

Id. at 23.
Id. at 2.
50
Id. at 23.
51
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668-9 (2017).
52
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1680 (2017).
53
21 U.S.C. §262(l)(2)(A).
54
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1352 (2015).
49

2018]

The Biosimilar Patent Dance

145

The failure to give the aBLA meant no artificial infringement occurred,
making §271(e)(4) inapplicable.55
The Court also held that aBLA handover is not enforceable by
federal injunction because of the text found in §262(l)(9)(C), which
states that if an applicant fails to provide the aBLA to the RPS, then the
RPS has a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. §2201 for declaration of
infringement, validity, or enforceability for the patents involved in the
biologic or its manufacture.56 What this means is that an RPS can file
a declaratory judgment action against an applicant for artificial
infringement. This gives the RPS control over the scope and timing of
litigation that the applicant would otherwise possess, but more
importantly, it deprives the applicant of the power to be sure of its legal
rights prior to marketing. Consequently, this position puts the applicant
at risk of spending money on moving forward with commercial
marketing ventures without the assurance that such marketing will be
found legal in later litigation.
The Court continued to explain that the lack of any other textually
specified remedy for failure to hand over the aBLA indicates that
Congress intended this remedy to be the only federally available one,
to the exclusion of federal injunctive relief.57 Despite this, Amgen’s
original causes of actions included both BPCIA claims and state
claims, such as unfair competition under California Business &
Professions Code § 17200.58 The case was remanded to the circuit court
to decide whether Sandoz conduct was unlawful under state law, and
whether such state law remedies are pre-empted by the BPCIA.59 Upon
review, the circuit court found that any injunctive relief provided by
state law would exhibit both field and conflict preemption by the
careful framework of the BPCIA erected by Congress.60
b. aBLA Disclosure Analysis
The final result of the Supreme Court’s decision poses a choice to
biosimilars applicants: engage in the patent dance, or cede some control
of when and what patents are litigated to the RPS. For now, this will
result in a cost benefit analysis for manufacturers, which will be driven
largely by business decisions.

55

Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668-9 (2017).
Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C).
57
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1677 (2017).
58
Complaint at 2-3, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. et al, No. 14-CV-04741 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2015).
59
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1682 (2017).
60
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326 (2017).
56
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It is worth noting an important difference in the questions that
Amgen posed at the trial level and the answers that the Supreme Court
supplied. Amgen’s disclosure claim was functionally comprised by two
questions: (1) is aBLA disclosure “required,” and (2) is injunctive relief
available for violation of that requirement? Yet, the Court’s response
was to the question “is injunctive relief available for violations of the
required aBLA disclosure?” The Court deftly avoided answering the
direct question of whether aBLA disclosure is “required” in the sense
that it is unlawful to refuse to do so, or whether it is simply a “condition
precedent.”61 The Court stated: “[w]e decline to resolve this particular
dispute definitively because it does not present a question of federal
law.”62 It continued on to explain that a federal court’s job in this
situation was to determine whether the aBLA had been supplied to the
RPS, and if not, to allow the RPS to file a declaratory judgment action,
per §262(l)(9)(C).63 A ruling on whether the aBLA disclosure is
mandatory or conditional would only matter in the context of
designating it as “unlawful” conduct for the purposes of other laws
where specifically “unlawful” conduct is penalized.64 (One such
example is California Business & Professions Code § 17200.)
The Court then remanded the case to the circuit court to
specifically decide if California law would treat noncompliance with
the requirement as “unlawful,” which would potentially open the door
to state law remedies.65 Despite this, the circuit court’s opinion in the
remanded case also manages to artfully avoid answering the direct
question of whether noncompliance is “unlawful.” Instead, the circuit
court goes directly to the question of whether federal law in this arena
pre-empts any state law, which the court affirms.66 By deciding that no
possible state remedy would be applicable due to preemption, the
circuit court avoided having to answer the Supreme Court’s question
of the “unlawful” nature of the behavior for purposes of state law.
This result is yet another parallel with the Hatch-Waxman
provisions: a company harmed by another company’s actions under
Hatch-Waxman cannot obtain a court order for compliance. Despite
closing the door, the Court left the proverbial window open: in a
footnote, the Court commented that it’s holding “express[ed] no view
on whether a district court could take into account an applicant’s
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violation of §262(l)(2)(A) (or any other BPCIA procedural
requirement) in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction . . .
against marketing the biosimilars.”67 It appears that the Court left open
the possibility that a district court could consider a company’s violation
of aBLA disclosure as a factor in deciding to give injunctive relief
during a patent infringement trial.68 Given the quality and quantity of
BPCIA litigation that has occurred, it is likely that this point will come
up in future cases.
In addition to the existing legal wrangling over BPCIA
requirements, one notable provision has thus far not been given a great
deal of attention. §252(f) states that any person that violates the
provisions of the section can be fined or imprisoned up to one year.69
This leaves open the possibility of federal criminal charges for
violations of BPCIA, as well as giving the FDA a lever upon which to
rely if it decides to compel companies to comply with the statute.
c. NCM prior to FDA Approval
§262(l)(8)(A) states that an aBLA applicant will “provide notice
to the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date
of the first commercial marketing of the biological product is licensed.
. . .”70 While the circuit court interpreted this language to mean that the
applicant had to receive FDA licensure prior to NCM issuance, the
Supreme Court disagreed.71
The Court applied a grammatical analysis to the text, holding that
“‘biological product licensed under subsection (k)’ modifies
‘commercial marketing’ rather than ‘notice,’ ‘commercial marketing’
is the point in time by which the biosimilar must be ‘licensed.’”72 This
gives the applicant full freedom on whether to submit the NCM before
or after FDA approval. The Court disagreed with the circuit court’s
ruling that the provision implied two separate time requirements for
provision of the NCM – after FDA approval and at least 180 days
before commercial sale.73 “Had Congress intended to impose two
timing requirements in §262(l)(8)(A), ‘it presumably would have done
so expressly as it did in the immediately following’ subparagraph.”74
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d. NCM Analysis
While Supreme Court’s ruling on the NCM issue was based
largely on grammatical analysis, the conclusion was well supported by
arguments concerning Congressional intent. Specifically, whether
NCM issuance was required to occur at least 180 days after FDA
licensure. It is understood that FDA licensure will only occur after the
end of a patent holder’s exclusivity period. If the Court had decided in
Amgen’s favor, this would have resulted in exclusivity periods
effectively becoming 12.5 years instead of 12 years. Such a change in
policy is not something specifically intended by Congress, and thus
supports the position that Congress did not plan for the statute to be
interpreted as such. 75
e. Can companies engage in the patent
dance only part-way?
While Amgen v. Sandoz addressed refusal to follow the BPCIA
litigation pathway, other companies have attempted to hedge their bets
by engaging in the patent dance, but only to the degree maximally
advantageous to them. This has been the strategy adopted in numerous
cases, resulting in similarly legion quantities of litigation.
Unfortunately, none of these cases have been granted certiorari by the
Supreme Court, so we have only district and appellate opinions upon
which to rely. The two cases outlined below are instructive as to both
current litigation strategies and judicial responses.
B. Janssen v. Celltrion
1. Background
In 2015, Janssen Biotech Inc. filed suit against Celltrion Inc. for,
amongst other things, failure to disclose manufacturing information.76
Celltrion handed over its aBLA application to Janssen as specified by
the BPCIA, but failed to hand over the manufacturing information that
is also specified in the BPCIA.77 While the parties moved forward part
way through the information exchange process, Janssen repeatedly
requested the manufacturing information, and was rebuffed each
time.78 Celltrion also acquiesced to Janssen’s first round list of patents
to litigate, and refused to continue any further in the patent dance on
75
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the theory that acquiescence to the list renders the remaining steps
moot.79
Celltrion also claimed that Janssen was required to file suit within
30 days of receiving Celltrion’s acquiescence to litigate over the
patents sent to them in the first round of the patent dance, with failure
to do so resulting in only reasonable royalties as an available remedy.80
Celltrion’s position relied on 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6), which states that
infringement damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(l)(4) and (5)(B) are
limited to reasonable royalty if the suit is filed more than 30 days after
the patent dance.81 Janssen’s position was that the 30-day filing
requirement only applied to patents that were a result of a full patent
dance, and that failure to follow the required steps meant that the 30day requirement was not applicable, meaning Janssen could seek lost
profits. 82
It appears that Celltrion’s strategy was to set the tempo of
litigation by not handing over manufacturing patents related to the
aBLA, thereby limiting Janssen’s “menu” of patents upon which it
could dispute. When Janssen picked out a set of relevant product
patents for the first round of information exchange, Celltrion simply
acquiesced to Janssen’s chosen patents. Because Janssen believed it
had to pick patents that it had information on, and because the
manufacturing information was withheld, Celltrion adroitly limited
Janssen’s ability to sue for the full suite of appropriate patents (or so it
thought).
2. District Court Decision
Judge Wolf of the Massachusetts District Court favored Janssen’s
position on the issue of lost profits versus reasonable royalties being
available. When discussing the reasonable royalty limitation of
infringement cases resulting from a full patent dance, the court stated
that “[i]t is only the patents that emerge from this negotiation and, if
necessary, dispute resolution procedure that are subject to a reasonable
royalty damages limitation if the patentee does not sue within 30 days
of the end of this process.”83 Essentially, the court held that the
reasonable royalty limitation only applied to patents that were an end
product of the full patent dance.
79
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The court continued on to discuss the word “shall” as used in
§262(l)(4) and (5), which states that parties “shall engage in good faith
negotiations . . .” and concluded that the language indicated a statutory
requirement of following the steps in order to receive the benefit of
limiting damages to reasonable royalties. 84
3. Analysis
This ruling was interesting in its contrast to Amgen v. Sandoz in
the different amount of “bite” the court construes the BPCIA as having.
While Amgen’s holding gave an RPS a relatively limited amount of
leverage by giving it the power to set the tempo of litigation, this ruling
gives an RPS a more specific and sharp ability to pursue far more
damages in cases of non-compliance. This ruling appears to punish
non-compliance more concretely.
C.

Amgen v. Hospira
1. Background

In a parallel litigation to Janssen v Celltrion, Amgen filed suit in
2015 against Hospira Inc., claiming that Hospira had failed to provide
adequate manufacturing information in conjunction with its aBLA
disclosure to Amgen.85 It should be noted that Hospira’s response was
that the required information was part of its aBLA disclosure.86 The
parties continued on with the patent dance, resulting in an infringement
suit for a set of patents connected to drug production methods. Amgen
went on to assert that Hospira’s refusal to hand over information in
connection with a cell culture medium used in their production process
prevented Amgen from “assess[ing] the reasonableness of asserting
claims for infringement” during the required rounds of information
exchange.87 Amgen sought discovery to remedy the situation, as
contemplated and allowed in the Supreme Court reviewed decision of
Amgen v. Sandoz.88 The district court found that Hospira had to
produce the required information only insofar as it was relevant to the
existing claims of infringement, and not on the much broader basis of
BPCIA requirements not tied to specific claims.89 Based on this
84
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analysis, the district court ruled against Amgen, stating that the sought
information was not relevant to the claimed infringements. 90
2. Circuit Court Decisions
Unsurprisingly, Amgen appealed this ruling.91 In a decision
handed down after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Amgen v. Sandoz, the
circuit court looked to five possible avenues that Amgen could pursue
to compel disclosure of process information related to §262(l)(2)(A).92
(1) Injunctive relief as a matter of federal law to enforce
compliance with the mandates set out in the BPCIA.93
(2) Injunctive relief as a matter of state law.94
(3) Filing suit for patent infringement on the basis of failure
to comply with the disclosures of §262(l)(2)(A).95
(4) Filing suit on patents actually described in §262(l)(3),
which are the ones that the RPS believes could reasonably
be asserted in the post-patent dance litigation.96
(5) Filing suit on a patent that could be identified under
§262(l)(3).97
Per Amgen v. Sandoz, option (1) was explicitly shut down.98
Option (2) was also shut down several months later when, on remand,
the circuit court found no state remedies available for violations of the
BPCIA due to pre-emption.99 Option (3) was also non-viable because
Amgen held that a failure to disclose information was not an act of
artificial infringement, therefore allowing for no cause of action in that
regard.100 As to options (4) and (5), Amgen did not list patents
connected to cell culture mediums in its information exchanges, nor did
it bring suit on those patents as ones that “could be identified” under
§262(l)(3)(A).101
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Amgen eschewed the above options in favor of a more novel
approach. It filed suit for infringement on the patents positively
established by the patent dance, then filed motions for discovery of
information in connection with the cell culture medium that Hospira
refused to provide manufacturing information for. 102
In its opinion, the court looked to Amgen v. Sandoz to inform its
analysis. Starting with the baseline that discovery is ruled by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that discovery for the
requested information would be inappropriate because it was not
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”103 The composition of the
cell culture media was not connected to infringement on the patents
specified in the complaint, nor any defenses raised by Hospira. Amgen
argued that withholding such information during the patent dance gives
an applicant unilateral power to decide which patents would be litigated
by preventing the RPS from identifying ones related to the product that
the RPS believes could reasonably be asserted. This is exactly the
situation outlined in Janssen v. Celltrion above.
The court was not persuaded, pointing out that the BPCIA
penalizes applicants who refuse to exchange information by removing
the applicant's power to file suit for declaratory judgment, which was
one of the central holdings of Amgen v. Sandoz. Moreover, the court
underscored the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 requirement
of filing claims that “will likely have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”104 On
this basis, “if a sponsor forms a belief based on an inquiry limited by
an applicant's withholding of information, the sponsor has still satisfied
Rule 11.”105 The result was that Amgen should have filed all
complaints it believed might reasonably be borne out by discovery,
instead of limiting its complaints and then using discovery to give
grounds for amending the complaints.
3. Analysis
The result of this holding, if upheld, is deeply uncertain. On one
hand, it correctly punishes actors that benefit themselves by using the
BPCIA’s abbreviated approval pathway but refuse to abide by its
litigation curtailing patent dance.
On the other hand, overly zealous RPS actors may see this ruling
as a carte blanche to engage in the full patent dance, and then
102
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subsequently file suit for additional patents on the grounds of some
modicum of belief that discovery will yield new ones worth litigating.
Applicants may fear this exact result, driving them further away from
a willingness to engage in the patent dance at all, ultimately demeaning
its purpose of reducing litigation times to get affordable drugs to
patients more quickly.
IV OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS
The results of Amgen v. Sandoz and cases citing it may be
instructive in the coming years of biosimilar related litigation. Now that
the Court has established that the patent dance is optional, applicants
are given the power to choose between sharing all required
information, or giving the RPS power to file for declaratory judgments
or standard patent infringement suits. This leads to less certainty for
RPS actors since they will never know what option an applicant will
take ahead of time, putting the onus of litigation preparedness on
innovators. Furthermore, the BPCIA was meant to curtail endless
patent infringement litigation. By de-clawing the BPCIA of federal
injunctive relief as an option and allowing patent infringement
litigation as a viable alternative, this purpose is at least partially
thwarted. The Act itself was the result of 4 years of negotiation, and
while maxims of statutory construction cannot be ignored, it seems that
the result here upsets an already delicate balance of interests. 106
Moreover, the attitude of “add it to the complaint and hope you
can get discovery on it” is contrary to the spirit of the BPCIA, since
this runs against the purpose of creating more transparency to reduce
litigious gamesmanship. Minimizing one party’s information harms its
ability to prepare accordingly and act as a maximally informed rational
actor, unnecessarily generating more risk and cost.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, the gamesmanship on display in the above outlined
cases ultimately harm the consumer. The BPCIA was designed to
reduce the time and cost of litigation, ensuring generic biologics reach
market as quickly as possible while protecting patent holder rights,
consequently balancing the profit motive of innovators and the
downward pressure on costs for consumers. Instead of abiding by the
rules, both sides have taken advantage of arguably unclear statutory
drafting. This has hurt consumers in both cost and time: the colossal
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legal fees associated with major litigation will no doubt be passed to
consumers, and injunctions set by courts with pending cases have
slowed the release of generics.
While drug prices have been a major political talking point in
recent years, it is unclear whether anyone is willing to spend political
capital on legislative action aimed at fixing the statutory language of
the BPCIA. Thus far, it seems that balancing interests of innovators and
consumers remains within legislative rather than judicial expertise.
While maxims of statutory construction are a vital tool of
interpretation, it appears that their use has thwarted the original purpose
of the text to which they apply, ultimately to the nation’s detriment.
This is a lesson legislator need to remember as they continue working
towards solutions that benefit all the stakeholders in the
pharmaceuticals industry.

